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STARTING OVER WITH A CLEAN SLATE:
IN PRAISE OF A FORGOTTEN SECTION OF
THE MODEL PENAL CODE
Margaret Colgate Love*
There has been surprisingly little recognition of the fact that our
system of penal law is largely flawed in one of its most basic
aspects: it fails to provide accessible or effective means of fully
restoring the social status of the reformed offender. We sen-
tence, we coerce, we incarcerate, we counsel, we grant probation
and parole, and we treat-not infrequently with success-but
we never forgive.1
INTRODUCTION
The collateral consequences of a criminal conviction linger long
after the sentence imposed by the court has been served, depriving
ex-offenders of the tools necessary to reestablish themselves as
law-abiding and productive members of the free community.
While most jurisdictions make some provision for eventual re-
moval of these collateral penalties, relief mechanisms are generally
inaccessible, or ineffective, or both. The result is that convicted
felons have no realistic hope of satisfying their debt to society, or
regaining a place in it.2 A recent American Bar Association report
concluded that:
* Inspiration for this Article came from my service as Chair of the ABA Crimi-
nal Justice Standards Committee Task Force on Collateral Sanctions, and as Pardon
Attorney in the United States Department of Justice from 1990 to 1997.
1. Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and
Adult Offenders, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 148. It has been said that "[a] theory of
law which withholds the finality of forgiveness after punishment is ended is as in-
defensible in logic as it is on moral grounds." AARON NUSSBAUM, FIRST OFFENDERS,
A SECOND CHANCE 24 (1956).
2. This phenomenon has aptly been described as "invisible punishment." Jeremy
Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISH-
MENT: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 16 (Meda Chesney-Lind & Marc
Mauer eds., 2002). Its consequence has been described as "internal exile." See Nora
V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need For Restrictions on Collateral Sen-
tencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 157 (1999). Professor
Demleitner identifies the three basic areas in which ex-offenders are permanently
disadvantaged by collateral legal consequences: restricted access to the labor market;
exclusion from the political process; and denial of generally available social and wel-
fare benefits. Id. at 156-58.
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[T]he dramatic increase in. the numbers of persons convicted
and imprisoned means that this half-hidden network of legal
barriers affects a growing proportion of the populace. More
people convicted inevitably means more people who will ulti-
mately be released from prison or supervision, and who must
either successfully reenter society or be at risk of reoffending. If
not administered in a sufficiently deliberate manner, a regime of
collateral consequences may frustrate the reentry and rehabilita-
tion of this population, and encourage recidivism.'
If pressed, most Americans are uncomfortable with a justice sys-
tem that is so unforgiving. And, as a practical matter, states are
having second thoughts about the economic burdens such a system
imposes.4 It therefore seems timely to suggest that jurisdictions
take steps to limit the scope and duration of collateral legal penal-
ties, and find a way to welcome the repentant and rehabilitated
offender back into the community.
This Article proposes a legal framework for accomplishing these
objectives. This framework is premised on a notion that the goal of
corrections must be the full and early reintegration of a criminal
offender into free society, with the same benefits and opportunities
available to any member of the general public. It institutionalizes
this goal by integrating it into the sentencing scheme, and making it
an important responsibility of the sentencing judge. It is concerned
not only with the specific sanctions imposed by the legal system,
3. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE
ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON PROPOSED STANDARDS ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d ed. 2003) [
hereinafter "Standards Report"]; see, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil
Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 599, 605 (1997) ("The more that convicted persons are restricted by law
from pursuing legitimate occupations, the fewer opportunities they will have for re-
maining law abiding.").
4. See, e.g., RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AN ERA OF FISCAL RESTRAINT 3 (2002),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/news/rkmm-fnl.pdf (last visited July 15,
2003). The wide net cast by law enforcement through the 1980s and 1990s has created
a large cohort of "internal exiles" who neither participate fully in, nor contribute to
society. Travis, supra note 2, at 19. It has recently been reported that "[m]ore than 47
million Americans (or more than a quarter of the adult population) have criminal
records on file with federal or state criminal justice agencies." Id. at 18 (citing BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 25 (1993)).
Further, "[a]n estimated 13 million Americans are either currently serving a sentence
for a felony conviction or have been convicted of a felony in the past." Id. (citing
Christopher Uggen et al., Crime Class and Reintegration: The Scope of Social Distri-
bution of America's Criminal Class (paper presented at the American Society of
Criminology meetings in S.F., Cal. (Nov. 18, 2000)).
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but also with the degradation of social status often called "the
stigma of conviction."
5
One thing that surprised me when I began working on the idea
for this Article was how much had already been done and largely
forgotten. On the theory that those who do not study the past are
condemned to repeat it, Part I describes the law reform effort of
the 1960s and 1970s, and the reformers' vision of how rights and
status could be restored to convicted criminals. Part II reviews the
state of the law today, and concludes that restoration procedures in
state and federal law have become less and less effective over the
past twenty years. Part III advocates for the approach to restora-
tion of rights in the ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and
Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons,6 and argues
that it can best be implemented by the two-tiered mechanism in
section 306.6 of the Model Penal Code. This mechanism seeks to
accomplish an offender's reintegration into society not by trying to
conceal the fact of conviction, but by advertising the evidence of
rehabilitation.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-BACK TO THE FUTURE
Forty years ago, in a time that now seems very far away, optimis-
tic law reformers set out to build a legal framework to limit collat-
eral penalties and provide for the early restoration of forfeited
rights to those convicted of crimes. They believed in giving people
a second chance, and that this was, in any event, the best way to
reduce recidivism.7 These reformers recognized that it was not
enough simply to restore legal rights; they would also have to ad-
5. See, e.g., Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
("Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him
vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also
seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.").
6. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretion-
ary Disqualification of Convicted Persons (3d ed.) [hereinafter "ABA Collateral
Sanctions Standards"], available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommenda-
tions03/103A.pdf (last visited July 15, 2003). These Standards were approved by the
ABA House of Delegates in August 2003, and their black letter is set forth in Appen-
dix B. As of this writing, the commentary to these Standards had not yet been ap-
proved by the Standards Committee.
7. See Gough, supra note 1, at 148.
There is considerable evidence to indicate that the failure of the criminal law
to clarify the status of the reformed offender impedes the objective of reinte-
grating him with the society from which he has become estranged. The more
heavily he bears the mark of his former offense, the more likely he is to
reoffend.
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dress the more subtle punishment represented by societal prejudice
against the criminal offender that lingers long after the penalties
prescribed by law have been fully satisfied.8 As will become clear
in the following section, this second-level problem of restoring lost
status proved a conceptual and practical challenge.
A. Early Restoration Proposals
In 1956, the National Conference on Parole, held under the joint
auspices of the Attorney General of the United States, the United
States Board of Parole, and the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency ("NCCD"), called for the abolition of laws depriving
convicted persons of civil and political rights, describing them as
"an archaic holdover from early times."9 More radically, the con-
ference called for the adoption of laws empowering a sentencing
court, at the point of discharge from sentence or release from im-
prisonment, "to expunge the record of conviction and disposition,
through an order by which the individual shall be deemed not to
have been convicted."' 10
At the time, a handful of states provided for automatic restora-
tion of rights upon completion of sentence, but most relied upon a
governor's pardon." The reformers felt that both of these ap-
proaches were of limited value: automatic restoration did not pro-
vide confirmation of good character so as to overcome
occupational and professional licensing restrictions, and pardon
was an inherently unreliable remedy, especially for those with lim-
8. There is a latent, pervasive attitude in our society which stresses the ge-
neric unworthiness of the criminal-his permanent unfitness to live in "de-
cent society." He is seen as an unredeemable, permanently flawed, ever-
threatening deviant. Proper citizens are felt to be menaced or degraded by
consorting with him whether or not he has "paid his debt."
Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal
Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 378, 389 (1970);
see also Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10
Soc. PROBS. 133, 136 (1962) (noting that conviction works a degradation of status that
"continues to operate after the time when, according to the generalized theory of
justice underlying punishment in our society, the individual's 'debt' has been paid.");
Gough, supra note 1, at 148 (quoting Paul Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil
Rights of Offenders, in NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION 1952
YEARBOOK 86, 87 (1952)) ("when the juvenile or adult offender has 'paid his debt to
society,' he 'neither receives a receipt nor is free of his account."')).
9. NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 136
(1957).
10. Id. at 137.
11. See SOL RUBIN ET AL., THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 721-22 (2d ed.
1973); Walter Matthews Grant et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Con-
viction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1143-48 (1970).
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ited means and few connections. 12 What they were looking for was
an accessible and thorough-going mechanism by which the re-
formed offender could be returned to society's good graces.
The concept of expungement or sealing of convictions had devel-
oped in the 1940s in connection with specialized state sentencing
schemes for youthful offenders, whose susceptibility to antisocial
conduct was thought to be temporary and who were therefore con-
sidered "easier to rehabilitate than adults. ' 1 3 The idea was to mini-
mize the legal consequences of conviction, and give youthful
criminals "an incentive to reform" by "removing the infamy of
[their] social standing.' 1 4 In 1950, Congress extended the "clean
slate" concept to federal offenders between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-six, making them eligible to have their convictions "set
aside" if the court released them early from probation.15 While the
federal courts were never able to agree about exactly what the
"set-aside" provision in the Youth Corrections Act was supposed
to accomplish,' 6 mirroring a similarly ambivalent approach to state
12. See Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of
Crime: A Model Act, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 97, 99-101 (1962) ("[T]he power of the
administrative agency is not well known and the agency is ordinarily less accessible
than a court"; pardon is "not a regular remedy available in the ordinary course of
affairs to all offenders," and in any event "in many states the effect of a pardon does
not achieve the annulment which is the goal of the model statute.").
13. Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 482.
14. Gough, supra note 1, at 162; see Grant et al., supra note 11, at 1149 (stating
that youthful offenders should be permitted to "put their past behind them" through
"the elimination of the penalties imposed by public opinion rather than those im-
posed by law.").
15. Federal Youth Corrections Act, ch. 1115, 64 Stat. 1085 (1950) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 5005-5056 (1976) (repealed in 1984)); see Scott Fobes, Expungement of
Criminal Records Under the Youth Corrections Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 547, 565 (1976);
Zacharias, supra note 13, at 477. In Doe v. Webster, the Court of Appeals explained
the purpose of the Federal Youth Corrections Act ("YCA") in the following terms:
[Congress'] primary concern was that rehabilitated youth offenders be
spared the far more common and pervasive social stigma and loss of eco-
nomic opportunity that in this society accompany the "ex-con" label. While
the legislative history offers little guidance as to the reasoning behind the
drafters' choice of terminology, it is crystal-clear in one respect: they in-
tended to give youthful ex-offenders a fresh start, free from the stain of a
criminal conviction, and an opportunity to clean their slates to afford them a
second chance, in terms of both jobs and standing in the community.
606 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (D.C. 1979).
16. Compare Doe, 606 F.2d at 1244-45 (holding that record of YCA conviction
that has been set aside must be sealed, and the government must respond in the nega-
tive to all inquiries about the offense), and United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279,
1280 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that a felony conviction that has been set aside cannot
constitute a prior felony conviction for the purposes of the firearms crime for which
1709
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
"expungement" laws, 17 the basic idea was to have a court grant
relief that would be more complete than a pardon, and more re-
spectable than an automatic or administrative restoration of
rights. 18 The purpose of judicial expungement or set-aside was to
both encourage and reward rehabilitation, by restoring social status
as well as legal rights. 19
It was perhaps inevitable, given the optimistic temper of the
times, that reformers would seek to extend the "clean slate" con-
cept to adult offenders. A model statute proposed in 1962 by the
NCCD gave the sentencing court discretionary authority to "an-
nul" adult convictions, the effect of which was to restore all civil
rights and "enable an individual to say, in testifying or in filling out
applications of various kinds, that he had not been convicted. 20
The NCCD proposal dealt with the awkward issue of candor by
proposing to limit what employers and licensing boards could ask:
"Have you ever been arrested for or convicted of a crime which
has not been annulled by a court?"'2 1 The NCCD report noted that
while six states had enacted expungement statutes applicable to
the defendant was convicted), with Bear Robe v. Parker, 270 F.3d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir.
2001) (finding that a set-aside conviction may nonetheless serve as a basis for termina-
tion of employment), and United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the YCA set-aside provision does not authorize expungement).
17. See infra notes 74-75, 77-79, 82 and accompanying text.
18. See generally Fobes, supra note 15, at 557-63; Zacharias, supra note 13, at 489-
90.
19. See Zacharias, supra note 13, at 489-90. Judicial restoration procedures are
variously styled "sealing," "annulment," "set-aside," or "vacation," but these terms by
themselves have no established legal meaning that would preclude using them more
or less interchangeably in this context.
20. Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency, supra note 12, at 99. It also provided
that the annulment would be effective only "[s]o long as annulment serves a rehabili-
tative purpose," so that if the offender committed another crime the record of the
annulled conviction could be used for sentence enhancement purposes." Id. at 99-
100. As to the burden on the court, "It is assumed that before issuing the order the
court would make any necessary investigation, typically through the resources of the
probation department available to it." Id. at 100.
21. Id. at 101. The NCCD Report noted that:
Recently the news came out that Harry Golden had served a five-year prison
term for fraud some years before he started publishing his notable periodi-
cal. When his record was disclosed, leading figures in the United States reaf-
firmed their faith in him. Carl Sandburg said, "This story ties me closer to
him." But the average ex-offender, faced with vital decisions by employers
and others, has no public repute and no public figures to support him. He
needs the help given by the model statute-as well as the understanding and
support of individuals, officials, and agencies.
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adult offenders, only Wyoming's extended to those sentenced to a
prison term.22
B. The Model Penal Code Takes a Different Tack
In 1962, the same year that the NCCD report was issued, the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code ("MPC") proposed a
more nuanced way of dealing with restoration of rights and sta-
tus.23 Under section 306.6 of the MPC, the sentencing court would
be empowered, after an offender had fully satisfied the sentence, 4
to enter an order relieving "any disqualification or disability im-
posed by law because of the conviction. ' 25 After an additional pe-
riod of good behavior,26 the court could issue an order "vacating"
the judgment of conviction.
22. The five states that at the time authorized expungement for probationers were
California, Delaware, Idaho, Utah, and Washington. Id. California's expungement
statute was criticized as ineffective in avoiding collateral consequences in 1977. Bry-
ant H. Byrnes, Expungement in California: Legislative Neglect and Judicial Abuse of
the Statutory Mitigation of Felony Convictions, 12 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 155, 155-56
(1977). The California statute has since been so watered down and restricted that it
has practically no significance. Interestingly, Wyoming has not only rescinded its
broad expungement statute, but now actually bars its courts from issuing expunge-
ment orders. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-307 (Michie 1997).
23. Section 306.6 ("Order Removing Disqualifications or Disabilities; Vacation of
Conviction; Effect of Order of Removal or Vacation") is set forth in its entirety in
Appendix A. This section is part of Article 306 on "Loss and Restoration of Rights
Incident to Conviction and Imprisonment," whose other sections are of historical in-
terest only in the opinion of this writer. It does not appear that the approach of
section 306.6 was widely adopted in the states, although the "vacation" procedure
contained in Washington's criminal code has many of the same features. See infra
note 81 and accompanying text.
24. Youthful offenders would be eligible only if released prior to expiration of
their sentences, as under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. An early version of the
Code's restoration provision was applicable only to youthful offenders and adults sen-
tenced to probation, and was described by the MPC's Reporter as "consciously
modeled" on the set-aside provisions of the YCA. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing,
Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 492 (1961). The MPC
restoration provisions were extended to all adult offenders only in the final stages of
drafting. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.5 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1954), and id.
§ 6.05 (Tentative Draft No. 7 1957), with id. § 306.6 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
1961). Both of the more limited provisions were bracketed in Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, in case the more general provision was not approved. Id. § 306.6 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 1961).
25. Id. § 306.6(1) (2003).
26. Adult offenders would be eligible for an order vacating the judgment of con-
viction when they had "[f]ully satisfied the sentence and led a law-abiding life for
[five] years." Id. § 306.6(2)(b). Youthful offenders would be eligible for such an order
at the same time and under the same terms as for an order restoring rights, viz., upon
early discharge from probation or parole. Id. § 306.6(2)(a).
27. Id. § 306.6(2).
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The effect of orders relieving disabilities or vacating the judg-
ment of conviction, including the uses to which a conviction could
still be put, was spelled out in detail.28 Inter alia, the conviction
itself could no longer serve as the basis for disqualification, through
it could be used to prove the offense conduct if relevant to the
sought-after benefit or opportunity. A distinguishing feature of the
MPC approach was its treatment of the issue of candor: neither a
restoration order under (1), nor a vacation order under (2) would
"justify a defendant in stating that he has not been convicted of a
crime, unless he also calls attention to the order. ' 29
The MPC's two-tiered process was evidently intended to accom-
plish the maximum by way of legal and social restoration for reha-
bilitated ex-offenders. 3° But it was specifically not intended to
remove the conviction from the records, or indulge the fiction that
the conviction had somehow never taken place.31 Unlike the
28. Id. § 306.6(3). This section gives exactly the same legal effect to a restoration
order under (1) and a vacation order under (2), which seems odd since by hypothesis
an offender would not seek a vacation order if his rights had not already been re-
stored. For a possible explanation of the difference between the two orders, see infra
note 30. In any case, (3) provides that an order under (1) and (2) would have only
prospective operation, and would not require the restoration of an offender to any
office or employment lost because of the conviction. Id. § 306.6(3)(a). The convic-
tion could still be used to enhance a sentence, and to impeach. Id. § 306.6(3)(e). The
fact of the conviction could be used to prove the conduct for purposes of establishing
rights of third parties, or:
whenever the fact of its commission is relevant to the exercise of the discre-
tion of a court, agency or official authorized to pass upon the competency of
the defendant to perform a function or to exercise a right or privilege which
such court, agency or official is empowered to deny, except that in such case
the court, agency or official shall also give due weight to the issuance of the
order.
Id. § 306.6(3)(d); see infra note 31.
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(3)(f).
30. Rather cryptically, Professor Wechsler justified the two-step restoration pro-
cess, and explained the additional practical and legal function of the vacation order, in
terms of the different effect given under the immigration laws to Minnesota's ex-
pungement process (offender no longer deportable) and New York's certificate of
good conduct (offender remains deportable). See AM. LAW INST., PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 1961 ANNUAL MEETING 312 (1961). While the black letter of section 306.6(3)
does not appear to distinguish between restoration orders under section 306.6(a) and
vacation orders under section 306.6(b), Professor Wechsler evidently thought that va-
cation orders should have some additional legal or at least symbolic significance.
31. Article 306 was explained by Professor Wechsler on the floor of the 1961 An-
nual Meeting. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 30, at 309-13. But no commentary was
ever published. On the issue of candor, Professor Wechsler explained that "you can't
say, 'I have never been convicted,' but you can say 'I haven't been convicted because
the judgment was vacated,' and call attention to the order." Id. at 310. He added that
"the Council of the Institute differs markedly with the Council on Crime and Delin-
quency as to the policy of that provision." Id. at 313.
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NCCD proposal, the MPC did not propose to rewrite history, but
rather to confront history squarely with evidence of change.32
C. The Reform Movement Peaks and Collapses
Over the next twenty years, national commissions and profes-
sional societies urged attention to the problem of collateral conse-
quences and their effect on offender reintegration, 33 and more
model laws and standards were proposed.34 In 1981, the ABA and
As originally proposed to the Annual Meeting in Proposed Final Draft No. 1, sub-
section (f) included a phrase that qualified the obligation to disclose ("when the truth-
fulness of such a statement is in issue"). Id. at 311. Responding to a member's
concern that "that middle phrase would seem to justify somebody with a mind like
Portia's in lying in the first instance," Professor Wechsler explained that the Reporters
"didn't want to seem to be legislating about how you can answer questions when
nothing turns on the answer." Id. He nonetheless agreed that "there is a problem on
the drafting," and the phrase disappeared in the final revisions. Id.
32. The MPC's vacation provision is similar in some respects to the process of
"rehabilitation" in the French Code of Criminal Procedure, described by Mirjan
Damaska in his 1968 survey of civil disabilities worldwide: the French Code process
"vacates the judgment of conviction and puts an end to all disqualifications flowing
therefrom." Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and
Their Removal: A Comparative Study (Part 2), 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 542, 565 (1968). Under French law, a vacated conviction is not removed from the
criminal records. On the other hand, unlike the MPC proposal, under French law "a
cancelled judgment cannot be used as a basis for adjudication of recidivism." Id.
33. See, e.g., HUGH C. BANKS ET AL., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL & MAN-
POWER DISABILITIES, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF Ex-OFFENDERS (1974); JAMES W. HUNT
ET AL., AM. BAR ASs'N, LAWS, LICENSES AND THE OFFENDER'S RIGHT TO WORK: A
STUDY OF STATE LAWS RESTRICTING THE OCCUPATION LICENSING OF FORMER OF-
FENDERS (1973); NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS &
GOALS, CORRECTIONS Standard 2.10, cmt., Standard 16.17, cmt. (1973); THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: CORRECTIONS ch. 8 (1967). Kogon & Loughery report that The National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recommended in its 1968 report, as part of
its basic strategy for the use of employment to ameliorate civil disorders, the removal
of "artificial barriers" to employment and promotion: "Government and business
must consider for each type of job, whether a criminal record should be a bar."
Kogon & Loughery, supra note 8, at 389 n.5. The Governor's Commission on the Los
Angeles Riots urged "employers ... to increase employment opportunities for per-
sons with arrest records." Id.
34. The Commissioners on Uniform State Law proposed in 1964 that a certificate
of discharge be given every offender at the end of his sentence, which would evidence
the automatic restoration of the right to vote, the right to hold public office, and any
other rights lost, "except as otherwise provided." COMM'N ON UNIF. STATE LAW,
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAW AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEV-
ENTY-THIRD YEAR 295 (1964) (citing Section 3 of the Uniform Act on the Status of
Convicted Persons). In 1970, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Crimi-
nal Laws also adopted an automatic restoration model. See NAT'L COMM'N OF FED.
CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE §§ 3501-04
(1970) (providing for the termination of collateral disabilities or disqualifications five
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the American Correctional Association jointly issued the long-
awaited Standards on the Legal Status of Prisoners, which urged
jurisdictions to adopt "a judicial procedure for expunging criminal
convictions, the effect of which would be to mitigate or avoid col-
lateral disabilities. '35 Expungement under these Standards was to
have very broad effect: according to the commentary, it "annuls
the fact of conviction and, thus, invalidates adverse actions
taken . . . on the basis of the conviction. '36 The problem of
whether and how the offender should disclose his conviction was
not addressed.
In the states, efforts had been underway since the 1960s to dis-
mantle the statutory apparatus of "civil death," and by the end of
the 1970s, a majority of states provided for automatic restoration of
civil rights upon completion of sentence. 37 Somewhat more cau-
years after completion of sentence). In 1978, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Law ("NCCUSL") adopted a Model Sentencing and Cor-
rections Act, which continued the automatic restoration of rights provisions of the
1964 act, but added provisions intended to address the problem of licensing restric-
tions and employment disqualifications. These provisions required that any such re-
striction or disqualification must be justified by a finding of a direct relationship
between the activity in which the offender seeks to engage and the offense conduct.
See Josephine R. Potuto, A Modest Proposal to Avoid Ex-Offender Employment Dis-
crimination, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 77, 88-91 (1980).
35. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS Standard
23-8.2 (1983). The ABA had earlier endorsed expungement for probationary
sentences. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 4.3 cmt. (Approved Draft
1970). The commentary to the 1981 Standards noted that "limiting expungement to
persons sentenced to probation reserves the remedy to those who least need assis-
tance in readjusting to society." Id. § 8.
36. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(3)(a) (2003) ("Orders relieving collateral dis-
abilities have only prospective operation and do not require the restoration of the
defendant to any office, employment or position"). Notwithstanding its broad effect,
the commentary to Standard 23-8.2 does provide that records of an expunged convic-
tion should remain available to law enforcement agencies, and that there should be no
bar to the use of a prior conviction for sentence enhancement. See STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, Standard 23-8.2 cmt. n.1. Offering a nostalgic snap-
shot of the times, the commentary observed that "[a]s the number of disabilities di-
minishes and their imposition becomes more rationally based and more restricted in
coverage, the need for expungement and nullification statutes decreases." Id.
37. In England and other parts of the world, there was a similar trend toward
replacing automatic (punitive) disqualifications with discretionary (utilitarian) dis-
qualifications. See Damaska, supra note 32, at 567. Under the English Rehabilitation
of Offenders Act, an offender would be "free of any handicap" resulting from a crimi-
nal conviction after a certain period of crime-free behavior. KATHLEEN DEAN
MOORE, PARDONS, JUSTICE MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 224 (1989). In recent
years, however, discretionary disqualification from employment in England has
tended to increase. See von Hirsch & Wasik, supra note 3, at 603 (noting the "clear
trend" in English law for employment disqualifications "to increase in number and
complexity.").
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tiously, states also began to respond to the more subtle problems of
social and professional discrimination against convicted persons. 38
A number of courts struck down on constitutional grounds laws
excluding convicted felons from certain occupations. 39 By the early
1980s, there appeared to be a "consensus that arbitrary restrictions
on the rights of former offenders should be eliminated."4
The high water mark of restoration reform efforts came in 1984,
when the House Committee on the Judiciary reported a sentencing
reform bill that contained a chapter on "Restriction on Imposition
of Civil Disabilities." This bill prohibited unreasonable restrictions
on eligibility for federal benefits and programs, and for state or
federal employment, based on a federal conviction.41 It also ex-
tended the judicial "set-aside" provisions of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act to all federal first offenders.42 The bill purported
to settle the judicial disagreement about the legal effect of a "set-
aside" order under the YCA, specifically providing that such an
order restores all rights and privileges, seals the criminal record for
most purposes, and "grants the offender the right to deny the con-
38. By 1982, "at least nine" states had enacted some form of protection against
automatic disqualification from employment and licensing based solely on a criminal
conviction. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 134 n.6 (1984) (citing laws from Connecti-
cut, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, New York, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wisconsin).
39. See Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1315 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a city
ordinance barring convicted persons from obtaining chauffeur's license violates the
Equal Protection Clause); Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (D. Conn.
1977) (holding that a state law barring felony offenders from employment with a li-
censed private detective agency violates the Equal Protection Clause); Butts v. Nich-
ols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 582 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (holding that an Iowa statute barring
convicted persons from public employment violates the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it requires no direct relationship between the conduct underlying the conviction
and duties of job); see also Vielehr v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 187, 194
(1973) (holding that a state employee could not be fired solely because of his convic-
tion for possession of marijuana, without a showing of relationship between the job
and conviction); Miller v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 294 A.2d 365, 370 (D.C.
App. 1972) (holding that an agency could not refuse to issue a street vendor's license
to a convicted person who had presented evidence of his rehabilitation). Cf DeVeau
v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 161 (1960) (holding that a decision to bar a convicted person
from a waterfront union office was reasonable in light of extensive evidence of cor-
ruption and organized crime on the waterfront). See generally ROBERT PLOTKIN, AM.
BAR Ass'N, NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYMENT DISABILITY STATUTES (1974).
40. H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 134.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 26-27; H.R. 6012, 98th Cong. §§ 4391-4392
(1984).
42. H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 138-42.
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viction. '43 The "goal" of this legislation was "to restore the con-
victed person to the same position as before the conviction. ' 44 It
dealt with the ticklish problem of candor by providing that an indi-
vidual granted a set-aside "is not guilty of an offense for failure to
admit or acknowledge such conviction. ' 45
In the end, federal sentencing reform took a very different path
with the passage of the rival Senate bill as the Sentencing Reform
Act in 1984.46 Developments in the world of politics had found a
convenient ideology in the "nothing works" misanthropy of the
"new retributivism," and the work of the American reformers was
brought to an abrupt halt. 7 Rather than extend or clarify the
Youth Corrections Act, Congress repealed it altogether.48 States
were encouraged to follow suit. 49
For the next two decades, the official government position would
be that criminals were to be labeled and segregated for the protec-
tion of society, not reclaimed and forgiven. Along with increased
reliance on prison to carry out militant anti-crime policies during
the 1980s and 1990s, new collateral sanctions and disqualifications
were introduced into state and federal laws to augment and rein-
force what remained of the old.5 ° Permanent changes in a criminal
offender's legal status served to emphasize his "other-ness." Other
more subtle discriminations multiplied, so that a person with a fel-
ony conviction was now barred from many employment and busi-
ness opportunities. 51 New technologies made it almost impossible
43. Id. at 139 (approving the interpretation of the YCA in Doe v. Webster); see
discussion supra note 15.
44. H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 142. The House report pointed out that very little
had been done at the federal level to relax restrictions on ex-offenders, and listed the
numerous statutes disqualifying convicted persons from employment or licenses. See
id. at 133-34 n.2.
45. See Sentencing Revision Act of 1984, H.R. 6012, 98th Cong. §§ 4391-4392.
46. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837,
1987-2040 (1984). The sentencing reform bill that had passed the Republican-con-
trolled Senate in the fall of 1983, was ultimately accepted by the House, in lieu of the
sentencing reform bill reported by the House Judiciary Committee in the fall of 1984.
See S. REP. No. 98-225 (1983); see supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
47. The interplay of crime and politics in the late 1970s and 1980s is described in
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 56-80 (1999).
48. See Sentencing Reform Act § 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. at 2027.
49. See MAUER, supra note 47.
50. See Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Con-
viction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROB. 10
(1996) (documenting an increase in state disabilities over a ten year period between
1986 and 1996).
51. Sharon M. Dietrich, Criminal Records and Employment. Ex-Offenders
Thwarted in Attempts to Earn a Living for Their Families, in AMY E. HIRSCH ET AL.,
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to hide a criminal record.52 At the federal level, Congress took
collateral consequences to a new level of irrationality, making a
single criminal conviction grounds for automatic exclusion from a
whole range of welfare benefits under the federal social safety
net.
53
Not surprisingly, as punitive penalties and disqualifications in-
creased, mechanisms for relief became less reliable and accessible.
Governors and presidents became more and more reluctant to par-
don, and state legislatures began to cut back on expungement pro-
visions enacted in the 1970s. Even automatic restoration
provisions were riddled with exceptions and qualifications. The
following Section describes the messy and dysfunctional situation
at the time of this writing.
II. SNAPSHOT OF EXISTING RELIEF MECHANISMS IN
STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Just as there is no comprehensive catalogue of the collateral con-
sequences of a felony conviction under the laws of the fifty states,
or under federal law,54 there has been no effort to systematically
CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., INC. & CTR. FOR LAW & POLICY, EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BAR-
RIERS FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 13, 14 (Cmty. Legal Serv., Inc. &
Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy eds., 2002).
52. Id. at 19.
53. See, e.g., Amy E. Hirsch, Parents with Criminal Records and Public Benefits:
"Welfare Helps Us Stay in Touch with Society," in EVERY DOOR CLOSED, supra note
51 at 27, 29 (2002).
54. The partial studies that have been undertaken in the past fifteen years suggest
that such an undertaking would be truly heroic. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PARDON
ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996) [hereinafter OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY]. The
federal law section of the OPA Survey alone, as updated in November 2000, is twenty-
two pages long. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED-
ERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION (2000)
[hereinafter OPA FEDERAL STATUTES], available at www.usdoj.gov/pardon/collat-
eral-consequences.pdf (last visited July 15, 2003). A recent compilation by the Libra-
rian of the Texas State Law Library identifies over 200 Texas statutes restricting the
rights of persons with a felony conviction, located in twenty-two different civil codes,
ranging from the agriculture code to the water code. See FRIENDS OF THE STATE LAW
LIBRARY, STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON CONVICTED FELONS IN TEXAS (2002).
Merely identifying the licensed activities and employments from which convicted peo-
ple are barred by statute in each jurisdiction would be a difficult and time-consuming
task, and this would not even begin to reveal the myriad circumstances in which a
criminal conviction is enough to trigger discretionary disqualification from employ-
ment, licensing, and many other benefits and opportunities. The rules are different in
every state, and are constantly changing. For example, as this Article was being writ-
ten, Michigan enacted a provision permanently disqualifying felons from jury service
as part of a package of acts increasing juror compensation. See Public Act 739 of
2002.
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identify and analyze the procedures available in each jurisdiction
by which lost rights may be regained and disqualifications lifted."
A cursory review of state codes reveals a hodge-podge of inaccessi-
ble and over-lapping provisions, riddled with qualifications and ex-
ceptions, and of uncertain effect. Only a very few states have even
attempted to implement a coherent statutory scheme by which of-
fenders may fully regain their rights of citizenship, much less their
standing in the community. It seems that reintegration of offend-
ers is neither encouraged nor expected.
Even basic civil rights are hard to regain in many states. While
all but eight states now restore the right to vote automatically upon
release from prison or completion of sentence,56 in many of these,
full restoration of rights is available only through an administrative
procedure, or by pardon from the governor.57 At least a dozen
states allow some adult offenders to obtain judicial orders expung-
55. State restoration procedures are summarized in the OPA Survey, but this is
now somewhat dated. OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at Al to A6.
Even more dated is the survey of state clemency procedures undertaken by the Na-
tional Governors Association in 1988. See NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASS'N, GUIDE TO Ex-
ECUTIVE CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 163-72 (1988).
56. Only two states (Maine and Vermont) permit prisoners to vote, though fifteen
states and the District of Columbia restore the right to vote automatically upon re-
lease from prison. OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at Al to A6.
Twenty-four states restore the vote upon discharge from sentence (four of which al-
low probationers to vote), and Delaware and Wyoming provide for restoration after a
five-year wait. Michael J. Gottlieb, One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disen-
franchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1942-43, 1948 (2002). Arizona, Maryland,
and Nevada impose greater restrictions on second offenders. Id. at 1948. In Ala-
bama, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Virginia, the right to vote can be
regained only through a pardon or other executive action by the Governor himself.
Id. at 1943-47. In Nevada and Wyoming the right to vote is restored only to certain
non-violent offenders. See The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws
in the United States, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (last visited
July 15, 2003).
57. Gottlieb, supra note 56, at 1943-47. In twenty-five states, a pardon is required
to regain one or more of the basic rights of citizenship. In addition to the six states
that require a pardon to regain the right to vote, seventeen other states require a
pardon to serve on a jury or hold public office. Arkansas, California, Georgia, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma restore the right to vote automatically upon
completion of sentence, but require a pardon for other civil rights. See OPA STATE-
BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at A-1 to A-3, A-7. Alaska, Colorado, Indiana,
Michigan, and Wisconsin restore the right to vote and serve on a jury, but require a
pardon to hold office. Id. at A-2 to A-3. Hawaii, Louisiana, Missouri, and South
Carolina vary this pattern by exempting jury rights instead of public office from auto-
matic restoration. Id. at A-2 to A-3, A-5. Mississippi restores the right to sit on a jury
automatically five years after conviction, but requires a pardon to vote and hold of-
fice. Id. at A-3. Massachusetts and Connecticut both have a seven-year waiting pe-
riod for regaining the right to serve on a jury, and Rhode Island has a three-year
waiting period before a convicted person may run for office. Id. at A-1, A-3, A-5.
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ing or sealing their criminal record, but this relief is of uncertain
effect and, in any event, is generally limited to certain categories of
offenses and offenders. Some states impose a lengthy waiting pe-
riod before rights can be restored, some afford more lenient treat-
ment to first offenders, and some have different eligibility rules for
what are evidently regarded as more serious offenses. Firearm
rights are often subject to an entirely separate administrative resto-
ration regime. 8
Of greater practical significance for offender rehabilitation, li-
censing and employment-related restrictions are generally not af-
fected when civil rights are restored, whether automatically or by
administrative process. The easy availability of criminal back-
ground checks in a risk-averse environment has multiplied the like-
lihood that someone with a criminal conviction, often in the distant
past, will lose a job or business opportunity solely for that reason.59
An inability to get or keep a job has been identified as a major
factor in recidivism.6°
Each of the four general approaches to restoration of rights
identified above-automatic statutory restoration, administrative
process, executive pardon, and judicial expungement-has its ad-
vantages and drawbacks.
A. Automatic Restoration
Statutes that provide for the automatic restoration of rights lost
as a result of conviction make relief accessible and even-handed,
freely available to state and federal offenders alike. But they may
not give offenders much help when they need a reliable indicator
of good character for purposes of employment or licensing. More-
over, precisely because automatic restoration does not take into
account a particular offender's situation, it is likely to be limited to
basic rights that arguably should not have been lost to begin with,
such as voting.
58. See OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at 14-18, B-1 to B-12.
59. Dietrich, supra note 51, at 18-19. See, e.g., Bill Schackner, Exposed Teacher at
PSU Resigns, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 2, 2003 (professor forced to resign
when university learned of his teenage murder conviction, for which he had served 15
years and been released on parole 24 years before).
60. See MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, RECIDIVISM AMONG FED-
ERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 28-30 (1994), available at http://www.bop.gov/
orepg/oreprrecid87.pdf (last visited July 15, 2003).
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B. Administrative Restoration
Administrative restoration schemes are not much more effective
for offenders seeking not just to regain their legal rights but also to
reestablish their credit in the community. For example, Georgia's
Board of Pardons and Paroles will issue a certificate after five years
of law-abiding conduct, restoring basic civil rights and relieving li-
censing restrictions imposed upon convicted persons under state
law.61 In Nevada, an offender may apply to the Division of Parole
and Probation for restoration of rights upon successful completion
of parole.62 In New York, a first offender may obtain a Certificate
of Relief from Disabilities from the Parole Board upon release
from prison (or from the sentencing court if no prison term was
imposed), and a Certificate of Good Conduct from the Board of
Parole after a certain period of law-abiding conduct.63 To the ex-
tent that these processes certify only to a failure to commit further
crime, they do not provide the sort of individualized assessment of
genuine rehabilitation that might be useful in avoiding discretion-
ary disqualification based on criminal conduct, or otherwise open-
ing the doors that close upon conviction.
C. Executive Pardon
Pardons have a broader restorative effect than automatic or ad-
ministrative procedures, insofar as they not only relieve legal disa-
bilities, but also signal that an offender has been rehabilitated. But
pardons are hard to come by, especially for the poor. The criteria
for granting a pardon vary widely from state to state, and within a
given state from time to time as a governor may be more or less
generous than the one before him.
In recent years, as governors have become increasingly reluctant
to issue pardons for fear of reprisal at the ballot box, the pardon
application process has become increasingly complex, time-con-
suming, and unreliable. Sometimes it is positively intimidating; in
Alabama, for example, persons convicted of a felony must submit
to the taking of a DNA sample as a mandatory condition of par-
don.64 In many jurisdictions, pardon applicants must fill out
61. OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at 44-45.
62. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 213.155, 213.157 (2001).
63. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 700-705 (2003); see OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY,
supra note 54, at 100 ("The certificates, with certain exceptions, preclude reliance on
the conviction as an automatic bar or disability, but do not preclude agencies from
considering the conviction as a factor in licensing or other decisions.").
64. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(f) (1975).
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lengthy applications, supply copies of dated judicial records, and
elicit recommendations from law enforcement officials who may
have long since died or retired, and submit to intrusive background
investigations. The pardon process may take years to complete,
and often results in an unexplained denial.
While the administration of the pardon power by an appointed
body like the Parole Board may provide some greater degree of
predictability and uniformity, the pardon power remains mysteri-
ous and unreliable as long as it is exercised by an elected politician.
Indeed, any discretionary executive restoration scheme tends to be
biased in favor of the wealthy and politically connected, and inac-
cessible as a practical matter to those without means.
Moreover, the effect of a pardon varies from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. In a few states, a pardon is followed automatically by exec-
utive expungement or sealing,65 but a pardon ordinarily does not
permit an offender to deny the fact of conviction.
Finally, while a federal pardon will avoid disabilities imposed
under state law,66 a state pardon ordinarily will not avoid disabili-
ties imposed by federal law.67 Accordingly, state offenders have no
65. In Massachusetts, the governor orders the records of a conviction sealed after
he has issued a pardon, and the recipient may thereafter deny that he has been con-
victed. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 152 (West 1989). Similarly, in Minnesota, a
"pardon extraordinary" issued by the Board of Pardons has the effect of setting aside
and nullifying the conviction, so that the recipient need not disclose it, except in a
judicial proceeding or in an application for a job as peace officer. MINN. STAT.
§ 638.02 (2003). The Board of Pardons consists of the Governor, the Chief Justice of
the State Supreme Court, and the Attorney General. See id. § 638.01. A person is
eligible for a "pardon extraordinary" five years after discharge (ten years for a person
convicted of a crime of violence) if he has not been convicted in the interim. Minne-
sota courts also claim an inherent power to expunge. See Barlow v. Comm'r of Pub.
Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1985). In South Dakota, a Governor's pardon
seals the records of the conviction (including, oddly, the record of the pardon) and
permits the recipient thereafter to deny the conviction. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-14-
11 (Michie 2002); see Associated Press, Disclosures of Secret Pardons Touch Off Up-
roar in South Dakota, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at A12.
66. See Effects of a Pardon on Authority to Deport, Firearms Disability, and Re-
mission of Restitution, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (Preliminary Print 1995), 1995 WL
861816 (O.L.C.), reprinted in 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 211, 214 (2001) (opining that
a presidential pardon relieves a federal offender of disabilities imposed under state
law if the imposition of disabilities negates the power of the pardon).
67. A few federal statutes specifically give effect to state provisions for pardon or
restoration of rights. For example, under the Firearms Owners Protection Act of
1986, state convictions that have been expunged, set aside, or pardoned, or for which
a person has had civil rights restored, do not constitute "convictions" for purposes of
prosecution as a felon in possession. 18 U.S.C. § 921(20) (2000); James W. Diehm,
Federal Expungement. A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 73, 99
(1992). Courts have generally held that an offender's rights must have been substan-
tially restored under state law. See United States v. Metzger, 3 F.3d 756, 758 (4th Cir.
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way of avoiding such federal collateral consequences as disqualifi-
cation from military service, loss of eligibility for citizenship, na-
tional security clearances and federal contracts, and a myriad of
federal licensing restrictions.68 Only a presidential pardon will re-
store rights and avoid collateral penalties imposed under federal
law, and this relief is not available to state offenders.69
Conversely, in states where a governor's pardon or judicial ex-
pungement is the only way to avoid or mitigate state law disabili-
ties based on state convictions, federal offenders subject to the
same state law disabilities will often have to look to federal law for
relief.70 Because there is no general federal statutory procedure
for restoring rights or expunging a record,7' presidential pardon is
1993); United States v. Gomez, 911 F.2d 219, 220-21 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Caron v.
United States, 524 U.S. 308, 318 (1998) (suggesting that all civil rights must be re-
stored, though affirmative act not required).
In certain cases, an alien may avoid deportation based on conviction if he is
pardoned. See Elizabeth Rapaport, The Georgia Immigration Pardons: A Case Study
in Mass Clemency, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 184, 184 (2001). A felony offender is
disqualified from serving on a federal jury "if his civil rights have not been restored."
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000). But see United States. v. Hefner, 842 F.2d 731, 732
(4th Cir.) (holding that automatic restoration statutes will not remove federal jury
service disability; rather, "some affirmative act recognized in law must first take place
to restore one's civil rights to meet the eligibility requirements of section
1865(b)(5)."). The federal prohibitions relating to involvement in labor organizations
and employee benefit plans last up to thirteen years, but may be removed earlier if an
individual's civil rights have been "fully restored." 29 U.S.C. §§ 504, 1111 (1998). A
few federal disabilities are subject to waiver. See OPA FEDERAL STATUTES, supra
note 54, at 15-16. Presumably a state pardon would also relieve any disqualifications
from federal health and welfare benefits that are imposed under state law.
68. See generally OPA FEDERAL STATUTES, supra note 54.
69. The President's pardon power under the Constitution extends only to "of-
fences against the United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2.
70. See OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at 2.
The disabilities imposed upon felons under state law generally are assumed
to apply with the same force whether the conviction is a state or federal
one ... In at least 16 states, federal offenders cannot avail themselves of the
state procedure for restoring one or more of their civil rights, either because
state law restored that right to state offenders only through a pardon, or
because a state procedure to restore rights to state offenders is unavailable
to federal offenders.
Id. A few states give federal offenders access to state pardon or judicial restoration
remedies, including Alabama, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See, e.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-29-101 to 40-29-105 (2002); OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY,
supra note 54, at 20, 72, 142. In Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, North Carolina, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming, federal offenders are eligible for restoration of
rights but not a pardon. See id. at 20.
71. The Federal Youth Corrections Act was repealed by the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. The only remaining provision
for expungement in federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 3607, permits a court to impose probation
without entry of a judgment of conviction for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (possession
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the only mechanism available to a federal offender seeking to
regain lost rights, or relief from the stigma of conviction. This sys-
tem sets up a curious inequality of opportunity between state and
federal criminal offenders, disadvantaging state offenders where
federal rights are concerned, and vice versa.72
D. Judicial Restoration of Rights and Expungement
A number of state codes offer a judicial restoration of rights pro-
cedure that generally includes a provision for expunging, sealing,
or annulling the conviction itself. Judicial relief is functionally sim-
ilar to pardon insofar as it is predicated on a finding of good char-
acter, 73 and judicial relief mechanisms are generally superior to
pardon insofar as they tend to be more accessible and reliable.
But judicial restoration provisions originally adopted or ex-
panded in the 1970s have been steadily cut back over the past fif-
teen years. Most expungement statutes now limit relief to first
offenders74 or probationers, 75 and almost all exclude serious or vio-
of marijuana), and to expunge official records relating to the charge upon the satisfac-
tory completion of a term of probation.
72. Residents of different states may also be subject to unequal treatment under
federal laws that incorporate state restoration provisions. See supra note 67 and ac-
companying text. In Beecham v. United States, the Supreme Court held that such
disparate treatment does not offend the Constitution, at least where federal offenders
are concerned: the fact that federal offenders may not regain firearms rights through
state restoration procedures leaves them "no worse off than a person convicted in a
court of a State that does not restore civil rights." 511 U.S. 368, 373 (1994).
73. For example, in Tennessee, an offender seeking restoration of rights must
demonstrate to the court that "ever since the judgment of disqualification, the peti-
tioner has sustained the character of a person of honesty, respectability and veracity,
and that he is generally esteemed as such by the petitioner's neighbors." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-29-102.
74. Several states have a broadly applicable statutory expungement procedure
that is limited to first offenders. Alaska permits judges to suspend imposition of sen-
tence and "set aside" the conviction after successful completion of a period of proba-
tion. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.085(e) (2002). Arizona allows some first offenders to
petition the court after discharge to have their conviction "set aside," a process that
releases the person "from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction,"
but does not relieve the offender from having to report the conviction if asked. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(A) (West 2001); Russell v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co.,
974 P.2d 443, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). In New Jersey and Rhode Island, expunge-
ment is available to first offenders ten years after conviction or completion of parole.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a) (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-4(a) (2002). In
New Jersey, the conviction is "deemed not to have occurred" for purposes of report-
ing the conviction-though an expunged conviction may be used in a subsequent
prosecution. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(9). In Rhode Island, the expunged convic-
tion must be disclosed in connection with application for certain jobs and licenses.
R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1.3-4(b). Ohio also has a first offender expungement provision
with similar limitations. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31- 2953.35 (West 2002). In
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lent crimes.76 Even New Hampshire's once-comprehensive "annul-
ment" statute has been nibbled away, and very recently was
restricted to first offenders.7 In several states, expungement is
available only if the offender has first been pardoned.7 8 Nevada's
Utah, first offenders are eligible for judicial expungement after seven years, but recid-
ivists must wait twenty years. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-18-11, 77-18-12 (1999).
See infra note 77, for New Hampshire's recent restriction of relief to first offenders.
75. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-302 (1987) (first offender probationer);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a) (2003) (probationer). Under the Arkansas model, the
conviction is automatically expunged upon successful completion of probation, but in
California the offender must apply to the court for expungement. Id. A California
offender whose conviction has been expunged must disclose the conviction in an ap-
plication for public office or license. In both states, an expunged conviction may be
used in a subsequent prosecution. Id. A popular variant on the first offender ex-
pungement statute is deferred adjudication or sentencing, where the record may be
expunged after successful completion of a period of probation. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 1.6-93-302(a)(1), 16-93-303(a)(1), 16-90-901-905 (1987) (deferring adjudica-
tion for first offenders); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-62 (2002) (same); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 853-1 (2000) (deferring acceptance of guilty pleas); MD. CODE ANN. art 27, § 641
(1996) (stating procedure for probation prior to judgment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-
9 (Michie 1997) (deferred adjudication available in all cases except those involving a
first degree felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(l) (1997) (imposition of sentence
deferred, plea may be withdrawn after successful completion of probation); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-13 (Michie 1998) (deferred adjudication for first offend-
ers); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 42.12, § 5 (a), (c) (2003) (deferred adjudication);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7041 (1974) (deferred sentencing). A few states also permit
a felony conviction to be "knocked down" to a misdemeanor after successful comple-
tion of probation, so as to avoid imposition of legal disabilities. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 19-2604(1) (1997); MINN. STAT. § 609.13 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-
02(9).
76. In addition to the states listed supra note 65, Oregon now permits expunge-
ment only for relatively minor offenses. OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(5) (1998).
77. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (2003). New Hampshire originally followed the
scheme put forward by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in 1962. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text. Its relief is no longer available to those con-
victed of crimes of violence or obstruction, or sentenced to an extended term of im-
prisonment. If eligible, a person convicted in New Hampshire may seek "annulment"
of the conviction from the sentencing court when he has completed his sentence and
served a specified period of law-abiding conduct, ranging from one to ten years. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5. Civil rights are restored automatically upon discharge from
sentence. Id. § 607-A:2(I)(a) & (b) (noting that an imprisoned person may not vote
or become a candidate for office); Id. § 607-A:3 (noting that imprisoned persons do
not suffer civil death). Upon entry of the annulment order the offender "shall be
treated in all respects as if he had never been arrested, convicted, or sentenced," ex-
cept that the annulled crime may later be taken into account for sentencing purposes.
Id. § 651:5. In any application for employment or licensing, or as a witness, "a person
may be questioned about a previous criminal record only in terms such as "Have you
ever been arrested for or convicted of a crime which has not been annulled by a
court?" Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency, supra note 12, at 100.
78. In Maryland, a person who has been pardoned by the Governor may petition a
court for expungement of the record of conviction. MD. CODE ANN. § 10-105(a)(8).
In Indiana and Pennsylvania, the courts have inherent power to expunge after a gu-
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unique scheme provides for judicial sealing of most convictions af-
ter a waiting period, but restoration of rights in that state appar-
ently depends upon a separate administrative restoration
proceeding or a pardon.79 Washington appears to have the most
comprehensive restoration scheme, following the Model Penal
Code in some (though not all) respects.8" A few states have effec-
tively repealed their expungement statutes.8'
All in all, the variety and complexity of approaches among the
states is bewildering. Of equal concern, the effect of an expunge-
ment order is often not spelled out in the law, and varies widely
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, in some states of-
fenders whose records have been expunged may deny that they
were ever convicted, but in other states they may not, or they may
deny for some purposes and not for others.82 Moreover, far from
being literally obliterated, "expunged" records almost always re-
main available for use by law enforcement agencies and the courts,
and in some states they may be accessible to other public agencies
and even to private investigative services hired to perform criminal
bernatorial pardon has been granted. See State v. Bergman, 558 N.E.2d 1111, 1114
(Ind. App. 1990); Commonwealth v. C.S., 534 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Pa. 1987). Several
states provide for executive expungement or sealing as a matter of law after a pardon.
See, e.g., OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at 85-86 (Montana), 117
(Pennsylvania).
79. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245 (2001) (sealing); id. §§ 213.090(2), 213.155,
213.157 (restoration of rights).
80. See WASH. REV. CODE § 994A.640(2)(b) (2003). Washington's scheme,
adopted in 1981, provides for automatic restoration of civil rights to all offenders
upon discharge by the sentencing court. See id. § 994A.637. After discharge, offend-
ers (other than those convicted of violent offenses or crimes against the person) are
eligible to have their records of conviction "vacated," which permits them to state in
an employment application that they have "never been convicted of a crime." Id.
§ 994A.640(3). To obtain this relief, the offender must have no subsequent convic-
tions and no charges then pending against him, and he must also satisfy certain other
eligibility requirements (five or ten years depending upon the seriousness of the
crime). Id. § 9.994A.230(2). Once a court vacates a record of conviction, the convic-
tion will not count for purposes of calculating criminal history in any subsequent con-
viction, though it may be used in a subsequent prosecution. Id. § 9.94A.640.
81. The broad sealing authority given Colorado courts in the 1977 Criminal Justice
Records Act was limited in 1988 to allow courts to seal a criminal record only where
the charges were completely dismissed or the person acquitted. See CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 24-72-308(1) (2001); see also People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Colo.
1993); Paula Ison & Tom Blumenthal, Sealing Criminal Records in Colorado, 21
COLO. LAW. 247, 247 (1992). Wyoming, noted in the 1962 NCCD report as the only
state that then made expungement available by statute to persons sentenced to a
prison term, now affirmatively prohibits its courts from expunging criminal records.
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-307 (Michie 1997).
82. See supra notes 74-75, 77-77 and accompanying text.
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background checks for employers.83 An expunged conviction may
generally be used to enhance a subsequent sentence and to im-
peach, and in some states it may even be used to deny employment
or a license.84
Though expungement still finds its occasional champion in the
academic literature, in theory and practice it is an unsatisfactory
solution to the problem of restoring rights and status.85 There are
at least four reasons for this, and all relate to its reliance on con-
cealment and denial. First, the concept of "expungement" requires
a certain willingness to "rewrite history" that is hard to square with
a legal system founded on the search for truth.86 Second, to the
extent expungement involves an effort to conceal an individual's
criminal record from public view, it tends to devalue legitimate
public safety concerns. Third, the expungement concept ignores
the technological realities of the information age; a process whose
benefits depend upon secrecy will surely be frustrated by the trend
toward broader public posting and private dissemination of crimi-
nal history information. Finally, because it is premised on a fiction,
expungement fails to afford an opportunity for the offender to be
reconciled to the community and "helps society to evade its obliga-
tion to change its views toward former offenders. ' 87 In light of all
these objectionable features, it is not surprising that so many states
have taken steps to eliminate or restrict expungement options.
83. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.815(1).
84. See, e.g., id. § 9.96A.020(3)-(4).
85. See infra notes 86-81 and accompanying text.
86. Expungement statutes have been criticized as both "ineffective" and "too
costly in both moral and legal terms." Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging
Criminal Records: Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 733, 735 (1981); see T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamin-
ing the Policy of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
885, 913-33 (1996); Michael D. Mayfield, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Infor-
mation in the Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1058-60. Moreover, the
legal effect of expungement varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See
Diehm, supra note 67, at 102-05. Indeed, the federal courts were never able to agree
about what the "set-aside" provision in the Federal Youth Corrections Act actually
accomplished. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
87. See Kogon & Loughery, supra note 8, at 378. These two veteran probation
officers conclude:
It is a profound mistake to mix in with redemptive legislation any provision
for concealing the records. To help the ex-offender by restoring rights and
removing disabilities is an absolute necessity. Alteration or destruction of
the record, however, only protects the body politic from confrontation re-
garding its own aberrant attitudes and the necessity to change. It basically
corrupts the fundamental correctional objective of rehabilitating offenders.
Id. at 391.
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11. AN INTEGRATED AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO
RESTORATION OF RIGHTS-THE ABA STANDARDS
AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE
A. The ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions
The new ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discre-
tionary Disqualification are the first effort since the 1970s to ad-
dress the collateral legal consequences of a conviction in a
coherent and comprehensive fashion. 8 The Standards build on the
normative approach of the "Civil Disabilities" provisions of the
1981 Standards on the Legal Status of Prisoners,89 but their analyti-
cal framework and enforcement mechanisms are grounded in crim-
inal sentencing theory and practice.90
The Standards begin by drawing a distinction between "collat-
eral sanctions," which are legal penalties imposed by law automati-
cally upon conviction, without any individualized inquiry, and
"discretionary disqualification," which contemplates subsequent
administrative action to disqualify an offender based on the con-
duct underlying the conviction. Examples of collateral sanctions
are Pennsylvania's exclusion of all persons with a criminal record
from employment in any health care facility, 91 Louisiana's disquali-
fication of convicted persons from serving as executors of estates,92
Alabama's rule requiring forfeiture of public office upon convic-
tion,93 and the federal government's disqualification of drug of-
fenders from eligibility for food stamps and Temporary Assistance
88. See App. B.
89. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
90. 90. The report accompanying the new Standards makes clear their reliance on
the principles and structure of the ABA Sentencing Standards (3d ed. 1991). See
Standards Report, supra note 3 at 12-16. In this regard, it is significant that the new
Standards are removed from the Legal Status of Prisoners chapter and relocated to a
previously reserved chapter 19 immediately following the Sentencing Standards. The
close physical relationship of these two chapters evidences a conceptualization of col-
lateral penalties as criminal punishment rather than civil regulation.
91. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10225.508(1) (2002) (providing that nursing homes,
home health care agencies, residential mental health and mental retardation facilities
and other health care facilities prohibited from employing an individual who was con-
victed at any time during his or her lifetime of any one of a broad range of enumer-
ated misdemeanors and felonies); see Nixon v. Commonwealth, 789 A.2d 376, 377
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (holding that restrictions on employment of convicted persons
in 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 10225.508(1) violate the state constitution).
92. LA. CODE CiV. PROC. ANN. art. 3097(A)(3) (West 1985).
93. ALA. CODE § 36-9-2 (1975); cf. State Highway Dep't v. State Pers. Bd., 628 So.
2d 878, 880 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (holding middle level EEO officer did not hold
"office of trust or profit" so as to automatically forfeit employment under state consti-
tutional provision).
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to Needy Families benefits.94 Examples of discretionary disqualifi-
cation based on conviction abound in state licensing and profes-
sional regulatory schemes, 9 public employment laws,96 and
regulations governing federally funded public housing. 97
With respect to collateral sanctions, the Standards seek to ac-
complish four things: 1) to limit collateral sanctions to those clearly
warranted by the conduct underlying the offense;98 2) to ensure
that defendants are fully aware, at the time of a guilty plea or sen-
tencing, of all relevant collateral sanctions that will automatically
come into play as a result of a conviction; 99 3) to give the sentenc-
ing judge an opportunity to factor in collateral penalties in consid-
94. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 862a(a), (b), (d)(2) (1994).
95. See generally OPA STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 54, at i-v. Thirty
years ago, an ABA catalogue of the licensed occupations and professions under the
laws of the fifty states documented the wide variation among the states, and within
each state, and whether denial or revocation of a permit or license was mandatory or
discretionary. See HUNT ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-3. The more recent OPA survey,
though far less comprehensive, shows that there remains considerable variation
among states.
96. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 831-3.1(a-c) (2003) (providing that a person may
not be denied public employment solely by reason of conviction, but a conviction may
be considered as possible grounds for refusal, suspension, or revocation of employ-
ment); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 20, § 415/b.4 (1993) (providing that a person convicted of
a felony may be denied state employment when the offense involved "disgraceful or
infamous conduct").
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2003) (providing that any criminal activity
that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises is
cause for eviction).
98. ABA COLLATERAL SANCTIONS STANDARDS, supra note 6, Standard 19-2.2
("Limitation on collateral sanctions") places a heavy burden of justification on the
legislature where automatic collateral penalties are concerned:
The legislature should not impose a collateral sanction on a person convicted
of an offense unless it determines that the conduct constituting that particu-
lar offense provides so substantial a basis for imposing the sanction that the
legislature cannot reasonably contemplate any circumstances in which im-
posing the sanction would not be justified.
Id. Under this Standard, there are only a few situations where a collateral sanction
will be so clearly appropriate, given the nature of the offense, that the costs of making
a discretionary case-by-case decision at the time of sentencing cannot be justified. In
this respect, Standard 19-2.2 could be said to create a narrowly tailored exception to
the individualized approach of the Sentencing Standards. See note 90, supra. Of the
four examples of collateral sanctions given in the text, only Alabama's rule would
likely survive scrutiny under this Standard.
99. Standard 19-2.3 ("Notification of collateral sanctions before plea of guilty")
requires a court to ensure that a defendant has been notified by counsel of "all appli-
cable collateral sanctions" before accepting a guilty plea. Paragraph (b) of Standard
19-2.4 ("Consideration of collateral sanctions at sentencing") requires a similar assur-
ance at the time of sentencing.
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ering the overall sentence; 100 and 4) to provide judicial or
administrative mechanisms for obtaining relief from collateral
sanctions. 10
The relief mechanisms called for by Standard 19-2.5 are con-
ceived as an integral part of the sentencing process itself.1 1 2 With-
out attempting to dictate to jurisdictions exactly how these
mechanisms should be constructed, the Standards contemplate
both a sanction-specific remedy, and a more general restoration
process: under paragraphs (a) and (b), an individual ought to be
able to obtain "timely and effective relief" from any particular col-
lateral sanction imposed by the law of that jurisdiction (whether or
not the individual was convicted in that jurisdiction). 0 3 Under par-
agraph (c), an individual ought to be able to obtain general relief
from all applicable collateral sanctions. 04 The distinction between
these two types of relief is significant: the first provides specific
relief that might take place at the time of sentencing or sometime
shortly thereafter. The second offers the prospect of a much more
100. Standard 19-2.4(a) requires the court to consider collateral sanctions when im-
posing a sentence.
101. Standard 19-2.5 ("Waiver, modification, relief") provides as follows:
(a) The legislature should authorize a court, a specified administrative body,
or both, to enter an order waiving, modifying, or granting timely and effec-
tive relief from any collateral sanction imposed by the law of that
jurisdiction.
(b) Where the collateral sanction is imposed by one jurisdiction based upon
a conviction in another jurisdiction, the legislature in the jurisdiction impos-
ing the collateral sanction should authorize a court, a specified administra-
tive body, or both, to enter an order waiving, modifying, or granting timely
and effective relief from the collateral sanction.
(c) The legislature should establish a process by which a convicted person
may obtain an order relieving the person of all collateral sanctions imposed
by the law of that jurisdiction.
(d) An order entered under this Standard should:
(i) have only prospective operation and not require the restoration of
the convicted person to any office, employment or position forfeited or
lost because of the conviction;
(ii) be in writing, and a copy provided to the convicted person; and
(iii) be subject to review in the same manner as other orders entered by
that court or administrative body.
102. The Standards do not require that the sentencing judge be given authority in
every case to tailor collateral sanctions to fit an individual's particular situation. Be-
cause the Standards strictly limit the circumstances in which collateral sanctions are
appropriate in the first instance, any collateral sanction that survives scrutiny under
these provisions will by hypothesis be an appropriate and necessary adjunct of the
court-imposed sentence itself. Standard 19-2.5.
103. Standard 19-2.5(a)-(b).
104. Standard 19-2.5(c).
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comprehensive restorative process that would address the issues of
stigma and lost status.
As a practical matter, if relief from specific collateral sanctions
under Standard 19-2.5(a) is to be "timely and effective," it should,
in some cases, be available at the time of sentencing. Mandatory
deportation is a good example. For many years it was considered
appropriate and efficient to have the sentencing judge make bind-
ing recommendations against an individual's mandatory deporta-
tion as a result of conviction, an authority exercised by state and
federal courts until the repeal in 1990 of the so-called "JRAD"
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.115 Assuming
that deportation of criminal aliens remains virtually automatic ab-
sent a waiver, compliance with Standard 19-2.5(a) might require
Congress to return the power to waive deportation to sentencing
judges, or to give that power to immigration judges at a subsequent
administrative hearing. There may be other automatic penalties
(such as deprivation of a drivers' license or an employment-related
disquaification) that would be unreasonable and inappropriate
considering the offense conduct involved, and might jeopardize the
offender's ability to make a living. Authority to relieve such penal-
ties is most sensibly put in the hands of the sentencing judge, or in
the hands of the relevant licensing agency.
The more general relief contemplated in Standard 19-2.5(c) has a
broader purpose, and is rather in the nature of a forgiveness than a
specific remedy for an unreasonable or inappropriate sanction. In
creating an additional opportunity for an individual to obtain an
105. In the 1917 statute that made aliens convicted of certain crimes in the United
States subject to deportation, Congress authorized state and federal sentencing judges
to issue a judicial recommendation against deportation ("JRAD"), a binding determi-
nation that deportation was not warranted on the facts of the case. Act of Feb. 5,
1917, § 19(a), 39 Stat. 874, 889-90; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 241(a),
66 Stat. 163 (repealed 1990). Sentencing judges had responsibility for making these
JRAD determinations in most cases until the repeal of this statute in 1990. See Mar-
garet H. Taylor & Ronald Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51
EMORY L.J. 1131, 1143 (2002). The black letter law proposed by the drafting Task
Force specifically approved the traditional role of the sentencing judge in this context,
on the theory that, like other sanctions, deportation should be imposed on a case-by-
case basis as part of a criminal sentence. The Standards Committee decided against
including a specific provision addressing the court's authority to grant relief from de-
portation, in part because such authority must derive in the first instance from federal
immigration laws. It was aware, however, that the ABA had expressed support for
broad JRAD authority in a 1975 resolution of the House of Delegates. ("[R]elief
from deportation upon grant of a pardon or judicial recommendation against deporta-
tion, now restricted to convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude, should be
made applicable to deportability predicated on any criminal conviction.").
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order relieving "all collateral sanctions," beyond the specific relief
provided for in subparagraph (a), the Standards aim to provide an
opportunity for criminal offenders to certify their rehabilitation
and good character. In this fashion, the general restoration provi-
sion in subparagraph (c) would function to restore social status.
Structuring this relief poses the same conceptual and practical
problems that faced the reformers of the 1960s and 1970s: How
does one devise and enforce a legal remedy for what is essentially a
problem of social attitude? At least, the Standards reject the ex-
pungement approach chosen by the Legal Status of Prisoners Stan-
dards; the drafters of the Standards specifically rejected relief
premised on concealment and denial, both as a theoretical and
practical matter. Beyond this, however, the black letter of subpar-
agraph (c) does not express any preference for the form its more
general relief might take. All that can be told from the black letter
is that this section is designed to accomplish more than the removal
of specific legal disabilities, which is already provided for in sub-
paragraph (a).
The drafters of the ABA Standards at one point considered in-
corporating the judicial restoration provisions in the Model Penal
Code into the black letter of subparagraph (c), but opted instead to
discuss specific implementing approaches in commentary. While
the black letter of the Standards now expresses no preference for
any particular process for implementing its general relief, a strong
case can be made for section 306.6 of the MPC.
B. Implementation of Standard 19-2.5(c)-
Section 306.6 of the Model Penal Code
The two-tiered process in MPC section 306.6106 offers a concep-
tually sound and practical way of implementing Standard 19-2.5(c),
for, as described earlier in Part I, it accomplishes both a general
restoration of rights and a symbolic restoration of status. 10 7 Under
section 306.6(1), the sentencing court may issue an order relieving
all legal disabilities after an offender has satisfied his sentence: "so
long as the defendant is not convicted of another crime, the judg-
ment shall not thereafter constitute a conviction for the purpose of
106. See App. A; see also supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
107. The author does not intend to extend the same endorsement to those provi-
sions of Article 306 governing loss of rights. Among other things, they appear to
place no normative limits on the statutory penalties and disabilities a jurisdiction may
impose solely on account of conviction. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.1(1)(c)
(2003).
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any disqualification or disability imposed by law because of the
conviction of a crime." Under section 306.6(2), after a further pe-
riod of law-abiding conduct (suggested as five years), the sentenc-
ing court may issue an order "vacating" the conviction.
In the first step of the process spelled out in section 306.6(1), a
judge is given authority to grant relief from all legal penalties and
disqualifications to an offender who has fully served his sentence
and remained law-abiding since his conviction. If applicable collat-
eral sanctions are properly narrow in the first place, as required by
Standard 19-2.2, then it will ordinarily not inappropriately disad-
vantage the individual to have them remain in effect while he is
still under sentence.
The comprehensive approach to restoration of rights in section
306.6(1) has important conceptual and practical advantages. Con-
ceptually, it treats collateral sanctions as part of the sentence itself,
even though they are imposed by operation of law and not by judi-
cial order. This means that they will necessarily be subject to the
same tests of fairness and proportionality as the sentence imposed
by the judge. As a practical matter, because relief is essentially
automatic upon a showing of a clear record, rich and poor alike
have equal access. At the same time, because it requires the per-
sonal action of a judge, restoration under section 306.6(1) carries
with it a certain imprimatur of official respectability that automatic
restoration and administrative procedures do not have. Finally, it
offers offenders both incentive and reward for rehabilitation, even
as it returns to them the tools necessary to fully reintegrate into the
free community.
But the MPC does not stop with restoring legal rights. Section
306.6(2) offers an offender the additional opportunity to have his
conviction "vacated" after a further period of law-abiding conduct,
suggested as five years. Presumably, during this period the of-
fender would have an opportunity to demonstrate his entitlement
to be recognized as a fully rehabilitated member of the community.
Presumably, this record of rehabilitation would be before the court
in considering a petition to vacate the conviction.
If a vacation order under subsection (2) has no additional legal
effect for the offender who has already had his rights fully restored
under subsection (1), because subsection (3) gives exactly the same
effect to an order under either section, one might well ask why an
offender would even bother to return to the court to obtain a sec-
ond order "vacating" the conviction. The answer must be that a
vacation order has the additional symbolic effect of certifying that
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an offender is truly rehabilitated. a 8 Unlike some expungement
statutes, the MPC's vacation provision does not purport to wipe
out or hide the existence of the conviction; indeed, it specifically
contemplates "proof of the conviction as evidence of commission
of the crime" in several different contexts. And the MPC specifi-
cally rejects an approach that would allow an offender affirma-
tively to deny that he had been convicted. 0 9 Instead, a vacation
order seems intended to operate as a sort of advertisement of reha-
bilitation and reintegration, the very sort of comprehensive resto-
ration of status contemplated in Standard 19-2.5(c). Consistent
with a broad purpose of making forgiveness accessible and reliable,
the MPC contemplates a key role for the sentencing court in signal-
ing that the convicted person has paid the full price for his crime
and has earned the right to return to responsible membership in
society. It is, in effect, a way of "celebrating the negotiation-or
survival-of the perilous correctional experience."' 10
CONCLUSION
The law reformers of the 1960s and 1970s imagined a world
where the public attitudes engendered by criminal conviction could
be overcome by enlightened laws. They had some reason to be
optimistic, given the energy with which many state legislatures em-
braced reform of their criminal codes and dismantled the ancient
apparatus of civil death. But the political and social climate
changed profoundly in the early 1980s, and the law would change
with it. Today we are essentially right back where the reformers of
the 1960s started, where criminal conviction works such a degrada-
tion of status that one's debt to society is never fully paid. The law
on restoration of rights in the states is pretty much in shambles,
and there is effectively no way for either state or federal offenders
to regain rights lost under federal law. The situation cries out for a
fundamental change in approach.
108. Professor Wechsler's explanation of the difference between the two orders evi-
dences an expectation that a "vacation" order would have the effect of vouching for
an offender's good moral character, a finding required under the immigration laws to
avoid deportation. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
110. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 8, at 390; see Demleitner, supra note 2, at 162
("ex-offenders should have access to a ceremony marking their official reintegration
into the community and the end of their exclusion and degradation."). Kogon &
Loughery remark that: "We solemnize the offender's induction into the system.
When he successfully concludes the program, though, we fail to institutionalize his
departure correspondingly. It's fun to catch the fish but hard to let him go." Kogon
& Loughery, supra note 8, at 390.
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If their efforts were defeated or undone in the war on crime of
the 1980s and 1990s, the reformers of the 1960s left behind a body
of work that provides useful guidance to a new generation of re-
formers. The ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions seek to cap-
ture and rationalize the "invisible punishment" of collateral
consequences within the framework of criminal sentencing. But it
is the venerable Model Penal Code that supplies the essential im-
plementing features.
The resulting scheme provides the offender both incentive and
reward for rehabilitation, and satisfies the community's need for a
ritual of reconciliation. In relying primarily on the sentencing
judge, it provides a more reliable and accessible process than par-
don or other executive restoration devices, and a more respectable
one than automatic statutory provisions. In contrast to expunge-
ment, it does not sacrifice the legitimate concerns of law enforce-
ment or undermine respect for the value of truth in our legal
system. It does not fly in the face of technological reality, or en-
courage either the offender or the community to evade their re-
spective responsibilities for coming to terms with mistakes in the
past. In short, it makes it genuinely possible for an offender to
start over with a clean slate.
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APPENDIX A
MODEL PENAL CODE
ARTICLE 306 - LOSS AND RESTORATION OF RIGHTS
INCIDENT TO CONVICTION OR IMPRISONMENT
Section 306.6 Order Removing Disqualifications or Disabilities;
Vacation of Conviction; Effect of Order of
Removal or Vacation
(1) In the cases specified in this Subsection the Court may order
that so long as the defendant is not convicted of another crime,
the judgment shall not thereafter constitute a conviction for the
purpose of any disqualification or disability imposed by law be-
cause of the conviction of a crime:
(a) in sentencing a young adult offender to the special term
provided by Section 6.05(2) or to any sentence other than
one of imprisonment; or
(b) when the Court has theretofore suspended sentence, or
has sentenced the defendant to be placed on probation and
the defendant has fully complied with the requirements im-
posed as a condition of such order and has satisfied the sen-
tence; or
(c) when the Court has theretofore sentenced the defen-
dant to imprisonment and the defendant has been released
on parole, has fully complied with the conditions of parole
and has been discharged; or
(d) when the Court has theretofore sentenced the defen-
dant, the defendant has fully satisfied the sentence and has
since led a law-abiding life for at least [two] years.
(2) In the cases specified in this Subsection, the Court which
sentenced a defendant may enter an order vacating the judg-
ment of the conviction:
(a) when an offender [a young adult offender] has been dis-
charged from probation or parole before the expiration of
the maximum term thereof]; or
(b) when a defendant has fully satisfied the sentence and
has since led a law-abiding life for at least [five] years.]
(3) An order entered under Subsection (1) or (2) of this Section:
(a) has only prospective operation and does not require the
restoration of the defendant to any office, employment or
position forfeited or lost n accordance with this Article; and
(b) does not preclude proof of the conviction as evidence of
the commission of the crime, whenever the fact of its com-
mission is relevant to the determination of an issue involv-
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ing the rights or liabilities of someone other than the
defendant; and
(c) does not preclude consideration of the conviction for
purposes of sentence if the defendant subsequently is con-
victed of another crime; and
(d) does not preclude proof of the conviction as evidence of
the commission of the crime, whenever the fact of its com-
mission is relevant to the exercise of the discretion of a
court, agency or official authorized to pass upon the compe-
tency of the defendant to perform a function or to exercise
a right or privilege which such court, agency or official is
empowered to deny, except that in such case the court,
agency or official shall also give due weight to the issuance
of the order; and
(e) does not preclude proof of the conviction as evidence of
the commission of the crime, whenever the fact of its com-
mission is relevant for the purpose of impeaching the defen-
dant as a witness, except that the issuance of the order may
be adduced for the purpose of his rehabilitation; and
(f) does not justify a defendant in stating that he has not
been convicted of a crime, unless he also calls attention to
the order.
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APPENDIX B
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (THIRD EDITION)
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS
(AUGUST 2003)
PART I. DEFINITIONS AND OBJECTIVES
STANDARD 19-1.1 DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this chapter:
(a) The term "collateral sanction" means a legal penalty, disabil-
ity or disadvantage, however denominated, that is imposed on a
person automatically upon that person's conviction for a felony,
misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not included in the
sentence.
(b) The term "discretionary disqualification" means a penalty,
disability or disadvantage, however denominated, that a civil
court, administrative agency, or official is authorized but not re-
quired to impose on a person convicted of an offense on
grounds related to the conviction.
STANDARD 19-1.2 OBJECTIVES
(a) With respect to collateral sanctions, the objectives of this
chapter are to:
(i) limit collateral sanctions imposed upon conviction to
those that are specifically warranted by the conduct consti-
tuting a particular offense;
(ii) prohibit certain collateral sanctions that, without justifi-
cation, infringe on fundamental rights, or frustrate a con-
victed person's chances of successfully reentering society;
(iii) provide the means by which information concerning
the collateral sanctions that are applicable to a particular
offense is readily available;
(iv) require that the defendant is fully informed, before
pleading guilty and at sentencing, of the collateral sanctions
applicable to the offense(s) charged;
(v) include collateral sanctions as a factor in determining
the appropriate sentence; and
(vi) provide a judicial or administrative mechanism for ob-
taining relief from collateral sanctions.
(b) With respect to discretionary disqualification of a convicted
person, the objectives of this chapter are to:
(i) facilitate reentry into society, and reduce recidivism, by
limiting situations in which a convicted person may be dis-
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qualified from otherwise available benefits or
opportunities;
(ii) provide that a convicted person not be disqualified from
benefits or opportunities because of the conviction unless
the basis for disqualification is particularly related to the
offense for which the person is convicted; and
(iii) create a mechanism for obtaining review of, and relief
from, discretionary disqualification.
PART II. COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
STANDARD 19-2.1 CODIFICATION OF COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
The legislature should collect, set out or reference all collateral
sanctions in a single chapter or section of the jurisdiction's crim-
inal code. The chapter or section should identify with particu-
larity the type, severity and duration of collateral sanctions
applicable to each offense, or to a group of offenses specifically
identified by name, section number, severity level, or other eas-
ily determinable means.
STANDARD 19-2.2 LIMITATION ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
The legislature should not impose a collateral sanction on a per-
son convicted of an offense unless it determines that the conduct
constituting that particular offense provides so substantial a ba-
sis for imposing the sanction that the legislature cannot reasona-
bly contemplate any circumstances in which imposing the
sanction would not be justified.
STANDARD 19-2.3 NOTIFICATION OF COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
BEFORE PLEA OF GUILTY
(a) The rules of procedure should require a court to ensure,
before accepting a plea of guilty, that the defendant has been
informed of collateral sanctions made applicable to the offense
or offenses of conviction under the law of the state or territory
where the prosecution is pending, and under federal law. Except
where notification by the court itself is otherwise required by
law or rules of procedure, this requirement may be satisfied by
confirming on the record that defense counsel's duty of advise-
ment under Standard 14-3.2(f) has been discharged.
(b) Failure of the court or counsel to inform the defendant of
applicable collateral sanctions shall not be a basis for withdraw-
ing the plea of guilty, except where otherwise provided by law
or rules of procedure, or where the failure renders the plea con-
stitutionally invalid.
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STANDARD 19-2.4 CONSIDERATIONOF COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
AT SENTENCING
(a) The legislature should authorize the sentencing court to take
into account, and the court should consider, applicable collateral
sanctions in determining an offender's overall sentence.
(b) The rules of procedure should require the court to ensure at
the time of sentencing that the defendant has been informed of
collateral sanctions made applicable to the offense or offenses of
conviction under the law of the state or territory where the pros-
ecution is pending, and under federal law. Except where notifi-
cation by the court itself is otherwise required by law or rules of
procedure, this requirement may be satisfied by confirming on
the record that defense counsel has so advised the defendant.
(c) Failure of the court or counsel to inform the defendant of
applicable collateral sanctions shall not be a basis for challeng-
ing the sentence, except where otherwise provided by law or
rules of procedure.
STANDARD 19-2.5 WAIVER, MODIFICATION, RELIEF
(a) The legislature should authorize a court, a specified adminis-
trative body, or both, to enter an order waiving, modifying, or
granting timely and effective relief from any collateral sanction
imposed by the law of that jurisdiction.
(b) Where the collateral sanction is imposed by one jurisdiction
based upon a conviction in another jurisdiction, the legislature
in the jurisdiction imposing the collateral sanction should au-
thorize a court, a specified administrative body, or both, to enter
an order waiving, modifying, or granting timely and effective re-
lief from the collateral sanction.
(c) The legislature should establish a process by which a con-
victed person may obtain an order relieving the person of all
collateral sanctions imposed by the law of that jurisdiction.
(d) An order entered under this Standard should:
(i) have only prospective operation and not require the res-
toration of the convicted person to any office, employment
or position forfeited or lost because of the conviction;
(ii) be in writing, and a copy provided to the convicted per-
son; and
(iii) be subject to review in the same manner as other or-
ders entered by that court or administrative body.
STANDARD 19-2.6 PROHIBITED COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
Jurisdictions should not impose the following collateral
sanctions:
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(a) deprivation of the right to vote, except during actual
confinement;
(b) deprivation of judicial rights, including the rights to:
(i) initiate or defend a suit in any court under one's own
name under procedures applicable to the general public;
(ii) be eligible for jury service except during actual confine-
ment or while on probation, parole, or other court supervi-
sion; and
(iii) execute judicially enforceable documents and
agreements;
(c) deprivation of legally recognized domestic relationships and
rights other than in accordance with rules applicable to the gen-
eral public. Accordingly, conviction or confinement alone:
(i) should be insufficient to deprive a person of the right to
contract or dissolve a marriage; parental rights, including
the right to direct the rearing of children and to live with
children except during actual confinement; the right to
grant or withhold consent to the adoption of children; and
the right to adopt children; and
(ii) should not constitute neglect or abandonment of a
spouse or child, and confined persons should be assisted in
making appropriate arrangements for their spouses or
children;
(d) deprivation of the right to acquire, inherit, sell or otherwise
dispose of real or personal property, except insofar as is neces-
sary to preclude a person from profiting from his or her own
wrong; and, for persons unable to manage or preserve their
property by reason of confinement, deprivation of the right to
appoint someone of their own choosing to act on their behalf;
(e) ineligibility to participate in government programs providing
necessities of life, including food, clothing, housing, medical
care, disability pay, and Social Security; provided, however, that
a person may be suspended from participation in such a pro-
gram to the extent that the purposes of the program are reason-
ably being served by an alternative program; and
(f) ineligibility for governmental benefits relevant to successful
reentry into society, such as educational and job training
programs.
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PART III. DISCRETIONARY ,DISQUALIFICATION OF
CONVICTED PERSONS
STANDARD 19-3.1 PROHIBITED DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION
The legislature should prohibit discretionary disqualification of a
convicted person from benefits or opportunities, including housing,
employment, insurance, and occupational and professional li-
censes, permits and certifications, on grounds related to the convic-
tion, unless engaging in the conduct underlying the conviction
would provide a substantial basis for disqualification even if the
person had not been convicted.
STANDARD 19-3.2 RELIEF FROM DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION
The legislature should establish a process for obtaining review
of, and relief from, any discretionary disqualification.
STANDARD 19-3.3 UNREASONABLE DISCRIMINATION
Each jurisdiction should encourage the employment of convicted
persons by legislative and executive mandate, through financial in-
centives and otherwise. In addition, each jurisdiction should enact
legislation prohibiting the denial of insurance, or a private profes-
sional or occupational license, permit or certification, to a con-
victed person on grounds related to the conviction, unless engaging
in the conduct underlying the conviction would provide a substan-
tial basis for denial even if the person had not been convicted.
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